Thesis: Despite numerous recently published references on executing Host Nation Security Forces (HNSF) development in a counterinsurgency, present doctrine fails to adequately address the chronic C2 problems that have hindered past and present operations and risks U.S. forces repeating past mistakes and failures.
Discussion: After nearly a decade of counterinsurgency operations, the development of Host Nation Security Forces (HNSF) has attracted attention because of its crucial role in successful counterinsurgency campaigns. The military's commitment to improving its capability to train foreign security forces is evidenced by an overwhelming number of new doctrinal publications highlighting HNSF development and counterinsurgency produced over the past five years.
Appropriate command and control (C2) is essential in enabling successful HNSF development during counterinsurgency, yet chronic C2 problems that hindered past operations have not been addressed in recently published doctrine. American experience in the Korean and Vietnam wars included significant HNSF development missions and, in both wars, inappropriate command relationships crippled efforts to develop the HNSF and weakened the overall war strategy. The example of Korea demonstrates that too much pressure from or direct control of an HNSF development mission by American higher headquarters hinders mission effectiveness and allows for disproportionate focus on U.S. operations which stunts HSNF development. Vietnam provides examples of several C2 problems all rooted in a tendency for U.S. forces to be operationally self-focused. This self-focus hinders HNSF development by outright neglect or by warping HNSF development into long-term dependency on the U.S. for support.
Unfortunately, because doctrine has not identified or suggested potential solutions to these chronic C2 problems, present missions to conduct HNSF development in Iraq and Afghanistan are hindered by similar problems.
Conclusion(s):
The joint Counterinsurgency publication should be modified to more fully address the C2 of HNSF development and provide sufficient warning against the tendency to be U.S.-centric in all aspects of operations. Although current doctrine's failure to adequately address past C2 problems is allowing the mistakes to be repeated today, some relatively short additions to the Counterinsurgency publication and related reference publications and manuals would quickly remedy the problem and provide a solid foundation for effective operations in the future. executing HNSF development in a counterinsurgency, present doctrine fails to adequately address the topic of C2 during HNSF development and gambles with the possibility that U.S.
forces will repeat past mistakes and failures.
HNSF development during counterinsurgency operations is challenging because it involves coordination between units whose cultures, expectations, and priorities are different. Even exceptional achievements by individual advisor teams will only result in frustration, inefficiency, and duplication of efforts if insufficiently coordinated; more dangerously, uncoordinated efforts can result in friendly fire during combined operations and contribute to mission failure.
Coordination, or at least implementing the appropriate command relationships to facilitate coordination, is ultimately a responsibility of higher headquarters' C2.
Past Experience: Korea and Vietnam
Past and present U.S. involvement in HNSF development missions shows repeated examples of inadequate command relationships that hindered HNSF development and exacerbated poor strategic goals: organizational structures allowed neglect, inappropriate command relationships prevented the flexibility that advisors require to operate, and bewildering organizational structures resulted in conflicting and changing guidance, grinding progress to a halt. American experience in the Korean and Vietnam Wars included significant HNSF development missions; in both wars, inappropriate command relationships crippled HNSF development efforts and ultimately detracted from the overall war campaign. Unfortunately, such mistakes continue being repeated because doctrine fails to adequately address them. To prevent U.S. forces from parroting mistakes of the past, current joint-doctrine must be enhanced to include C2 lessons learned from others' past mistakes.
Korea
The Korean Military Advisor Group (KMAG) began after WWII as a peacetime training mission controlled by the ambassador and independent of other military forces. The outbreak of the Korean War, however, thrust the KMAG into HNSF development during combat operations. 3 Because the Korean War was characterized primarily by conventional employment of U.S.
forces, HNSF development was never treated as essential, and a unique political situation allowed the Army of the Republic of Korea (ROKA) to be under the control of U.S.
commanders. The resulting C2 structure granted KMAG Advisors more sway over their Korean counterparts since they advised and spoke on behalf of U.S. higher headquarters. While this command relationship was advantageous for U.S.-controlled operations and helped simplify coordination between ROKA and U.S. forces, benefits came at the cost of HNSF development.
Rather than advise, KMAG personnel were expected and pressured to primarily serve as a means for American commanders to control ROKA units. focus on the quantity of partnered operations "became the litmus test of success … regardless of the operation's effectiveness or if it contributed to developing the Iraqi Army's capabilities."
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These examples are not meant to be comprehensive; they illustrate that the C2 problems experienced today are not new problems. Rather they are chronic and have plagued HNSF development and counterinsurgency operations for more than 50 years. Doctrine's failure to identify and address these issues allows them to be repeated.
Recommendation and Conclusions
The C2 issues encountered during past and present HNSF development suggest that current doctrine is lacking in two key areas. First, there is negligible discussion of the C2 of HNSF development. Second, there is insufficient warning of the tendency to be U.S.-centric in operations. Given that these have been chronic problem areas proven to impede HNSF development and to ultimately hurt counterinsurgency campaigns, the continued absence of doctrinal discourse on these issues is inexcusable.
The joint publication Counterinsurgency should include a discussion of HNSF development C2 issues: poor coordination between advisor teams and U.S. units caused by higher headquarters neglect, unclear or inappropriate command or supported/supporting relationships, and how inappropriate command relationships can hinder effectiveness in conducting HNSF. Regarding the tendency to be U.S.-centric, Counterinsurgency is itself prone to these trends, primarily focusing on early campaign stages, when operations are run by U.S. (and coalition) forces with limited or no HNSF involvement. Since this tendency to focus on U.S. involvement has been so prevalent in the past, the warning must be forceful; to avoid hypocrisy, parts of the publication should be re-written to emphasize the need to maximize HNSF involvement.
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Other references dealing with HNSF development should also be amended. The joint publication on advising should supplement its inadequate discussion of a notional command structure to complement the discussion recommended above for Counterinsurgency. 14 Additionally, it should include a discussion on the benefits of placing an advisor team as either subordinate or co-equal with a U.S. partnered unit, suggesting principles for how a higher headquarters staff trying to C2 advisor units could best facilitate their success. Finally, the Marine's Corps'
Tentative Manual for Partnering Operations (currently being revised) should, when re-released, be adopted as joint doctrine. This manual provides clear guidance that would help avoid the mistakes, made during partnered operations in Vietnam and Iraq, which hurt HNSF development by cultivating a sense of dependency.
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HNSF development, when used effectively, is a powerful tool within a counterinsurgency campaign. Although current doctrine's failure to adequately address mistakes of the past has allowed repetition of those mistakes in present operations, some relatively short additions to current doctrine could quickly remedy the problem and set a foundation that will prevent these problems in the future and enable successful HNSF development and counterinsurgency campaigns.
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